Introduction
Emergency programs seek to mitigate the impact of economic crises-income shocks experienced by an entire community or country-on consumption and human capital accumulation. Of particular concern are the poor who, due to inadequate savings, or inadequate access to credit or insurance markets, are unable to draw on resources from better times to offset a loss in income today. Further, the systemic nature of the shocks means that risk cannot be effectively pooled through local informal insurance mechanisms. Emergency interventions to date have included workfare programs, certain varieties of social funds, conditional transfers (eg. conditional on child school or health center attendance), training programs as well as traditional direct unconditional transfers in kind (communal tables, targeted food hand-outs, etc. ).
1
This article highlights some conceptual problems in choosing among these options, and evaluating one program within a genre vs another. It first argues that most can be thought of as containing both a transfer and an investment component, and that their evaluation as emergency programs needs to more explicitly incorporate the intertemporal nature of their design. More specifically, the mandated investments in either physical or human capital will benefit the poor, but in the future, after the crisis, and their implementation diverts resources away from alleviating present hardship.
Second, it argues the way emergency programs are financed, in particular how the burden is shared between central and municipal governments, also has important impacts on the criteria for evaluation.
The analysis suggests that most conventional means of evaluating projects generally, and emergency programs in particular-net present value at market discount rates, labor intensity, cost per job created-may not be relevant or are at least ambiguous in this context. As a result, policy makers are left with few "hard" indicators with which to perform the nonetheless essential evaluations of their programs, and this article will notably fail to provide any new ones. It does, however, argue for an approach where the policy maker weighs the appropriateness of deviations from the theoretically "ideal" benchmark program, and discusses the various arguments in favor or against these deviations. The necessarily modest goal is to clarify the key issues and provide more solid grounding for the necessarily subjective judgement calls that policy makers will inevitably have to make.
What is a Crisis?
Emergency programs or safety nets more generally seek to mitigate the impact of sudden falls in income below their normal or "permanent" level. There is a large literature on the importance of the ability to smooth consumption across good and bad periods in LDCs (see, for example, Case, 1995 , Townsend 1995 , Morduch 1995 , 1999 , Besley 1995 and the intuition can easily be captured in a standard intertemporal model.
For simplicity sake, we imagine an individual or community that receives income each year and makes consumption decisions based on comparing utility or welfare across two periods of time according to a linear function where total welfare across time is the discounted sum of welfare in each period.
U has the usual properties that welfare increases as consumption increases and that it increases at a decreasing rate. For now, we also assume that the individual or community can either borrow or invest, either at the interest rate R. Total wealth available to be distributed across both periods is therefore the discounted value of income across both periods periods. We are concerned only with their role in an emergency context. See Stewart and van der Geest (1995 ) Lustig (1997 ) Cornia (1999 and Tendler (2000) , and for more detailed evaluations.
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In this case where the poor can easily smooth their consumption, welfare across the entire period is maximized where
If the interest rate R=0, an additional dollar spent on consumption in each period should yield exactly equal additional utility. This i s the central insight behind the traditional permanent income hypothesis --people will smooth their consumption over lottery winnings and job loss so as to maintain the welfare arising from an additional unit of consumption constant over time.
Adverse i ncome shocks are thought particularly damaging to the poor because they lack this ability to smooth consumption across time. That is, their present consumption exactly equals their reduced present income: a fall in income during a crisis in period 1 leads to an equivalent fall in C 1 . Analytically, this fall in consumption pushes the marginal utility of an additional dollar today far in excess of that in the future. Put more concretely, tomorrow they may be poor, but today they are hungry and hence an additional calorie is valued much more now.
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This effect is magnified during crises which can be thought of as adverse shocks that affect many members of a community simultaneously. Not only are workers likely to be less able to find new employment or recover a temporary income fall, but whatever 2 For simplicity we assume the discount factor to be zero.
informal safety nets exist-community lending or grants-are vastly weakened by both the reduced income of the community and the simultaneous demands put on it.
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From a purely theoretical view, the gains in social welfare arising from redressing the impacts of crises are not distinguishable from those of economic growth-in both cases the ability to smooth by borrowing allows a shifting out of the social utility curve. The fact that in the former case we borrow from the future to raise present utility and in the latter we may raise both is immaterial from the point of view of raising total discounted social welfare. It is as reasonable for governments and the World Bank to lend for safety net programs that mitigate falls in present income as for gains in future productivity.
Crisis-alleviation Programs
Government's role can be seen as redressing the effects of the market failures that lead to missing financial or insurance markets necessary for this smoothing. States could simply lend money to the affected individuals or regions, but in general they have chosen to give grants that serve to increase the resources available today. This may be due to all the complexities that led to the absence of credit and insurance markets in the first placecostly monitoring and absence of collateral for example. Or it may be that society believes that some share of the socially optimal transfers to augment the permanent income of the poor are best earmarked for times when the necessary smoothing is impossible and hence the welfare gain from the transfer is highest.
Whatever the reason, if the amount of the grants does not fully offset the fall in income, the simple view sketched above suggests that the largest effect on welfare would be gained from dedicating them entirely to consumption today. Following this logic, emergency programs should be thought of as vehicles for transfers and the central measure of their success is their transfer efficiency -how much of resources earmarked for the emergency program actually arrive at the target population during the crisis. As an idealized benchmark, we might imagine the government deploying "smart" cash transfers that would perfectly and costlessly target those most suffering from a fall in incomes. In this case, the transfer efficiency would be 100%.
However, most of the programs envisaged today require that some fraction be dedicated to investment projects in either physical or human capital that will yield benefits in the fut ure:
Workfare programs use part of the government transfer for salaries, and part to finance materials for physical investment projects. The Chilean Programa de Empleo (1975) (1976) (1977) (1978) (1979) (1980) (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) and Programa Ocupacional para Jefes de Hogares (1982 Hogares ( -1987 employed unskilled labor in projects ranging from food preparation, drainage and road maintenance to well digging with an emphasis on high labor intensity. The Argentine also be expanded or made more generous in crises situations to serve as a means of transferring income as is currently contemplated in Colombia.
Minimo
Training programs that offer a living subsidy to the worker and cover training costs can be thought of as fundamentally similar to conditional transfers. These appear to some degree in the Brazilian Drought program, the Mexican Training Scholarships for the Unemployed (Probecat), and potentially in the Colombian emergency program.
Again, the number of participants can be expanded during crises.
Such transfer cum investment programs are, on the surface, appealing since they provide both an emergency transfer and a project yielding future benefits to the target population. Yet, from a purely theoretical point of view, they compare very unfavorably to our benchmark and, in fact, the investment component is probably rarely justifiable.
This follows from the fact that for emergency programs the correct discount factor to make future benefits from the investment component commensurate with those now is not the market rate of interest, but rather the "consumption rate of interest"-how much we value additional consumption in the future vs today. 7 Given the traumatic, but generally transitory nature of crises, the answer is likely to be "very little" and as a result, very little of potential transfers for today's consumption should be reduced to finance investment projects that will yield benefits in the future.
More formally, this effect can be captured in the first two arguments on the right hand side of equation 2a
which argue that the social benefits arising from an additional dollar of government spending (G) on the emergency project are comprised of the marginal utility arising from the share of the an additional dollar of G that is transferred to families in the crisis period (t), plus the marginal utility arising from return to investment (1+R)(1-t). The subscripts 7 See Squire and van der Tak (1995) p 27-28, 69. denote marginal utility during the crisis period, c, and marginal utility in normal times, n.
The third term we will return to in a moment. Equation 2b rewrites this as marginal social benefit measured in terms of "units of crisis alleviation"-the marginal benefit of a dollar during the crisis period.
What is now clear is that in calculating the value of the program to the target population, we cannot simply add the income flows from the investment project discounted at the market rate to the cash transfer. This would imply that the marginal utility of a dollar in crisis and non-crisis periods is equal which the intertemporal analysis above suggests is implausible.
In fact, the investment components represent the opposite of smoothing: every dollar spent on materials for a project that will yield future benefits takes a dollar away from present consumption. The effect is very large. In the case of workfare programs and some SIFs, often the share of the budget that goes to wages, and hence current consumption, is below 50%. 8 At a very basic level the government is saying: "I know you're hungry today, so here's $100 dollars, half of which you can consume today, but the other half (augmented by the gains of investing) you will consume tomorrow when you're less hungry."
For the poor to have decided to make this allocation on their own, equation (1) tells exactly what the rate of return would have to be. The project must give a return equal to the value of an additional dollar of consumption when the worker is hungry relative to the benefit of an additional dollar in normal times. The ratio of utilities preceding the returns to investment in the second term of equation 2b is arguably the "consumption" discount factor that should be used in evaluating these projects and it is likely to be extremely high. Middle class consumers in good times in the US are comfortable paying rates of interest of above 20% on credit card debt. Borrowing rates from m oneylenders in rural areas can easily reach 5% a month or 80% yearly. A consumption rate of discount of 30% seems plausible and will render all but the best physical investment projects unattractive. This is probably also the case with human capital investments envisaged by Progresa or similar programs which would yield returns of perhaps 7-13%. 9 In fact, by virtue of being conditional, such transfers imply that households would not have invested in human capital were they unconstrained.
Since future bene fits of the investment components are heavily discounted, the primary measure of program quality again, is the transfer efficiency, which, as we've seen, can be far below 50%. In sum, it is probably impossible, within our simple framework, to justify any of the transfer cum investment options relative to a straight unconditional transfer as emergency measures.
Why Might Policy Makers Want an Investment Component?
Why then, do rational governments and international organizations elect these strategies over unconditional transfers? More generally, when designing emergency programs, what factors may lead us or force us to depart from the Platonic "smart" transfers described earlier? There are several possibilities, many legitimate, yet virtually all of which are problematic from an evaluation point of view because first, the benefits may not be easily measurable or second, they represent objectives that imply tradeoffs with emergency relief. As a result, no a priori evaluation of the importance of these considerations is possible and policy makers are left to make some educated, if heroic efforts in that direction. What follows is not an exhaustive review of justifications for investment components. However, it may provide something of a check list to see which "ring true" in a particular context as reasons to depart from a pure transfer.
1. Anti-poverty vs. crisis programs: Most obviously, if, in fact, the situation is really one of ongoing poverty rather than a short lived-crisis, then the appropriate discount factor is likely to be closer to the market rate of interest and investment programs can be justified on their own merits. An infrastructure development SIF with volunteered labor would be more appropriate in this case than a high labor intensity emergency program.
2. Unmeasurable returns to investment: Unmeasurable benefits may raise the social return to a level where investment based programs are optimal, even if evaluation at the consumption rate of discount suggests they are not. As an example, income transfers without accompanying effort by recipients may be socially damaging or
cause social values to "depreciate" over the long run. The shift from welfare to workfare in the US as well as Colombia's concern with "asistencialismo" or dependenc y creating programs suggest that these effects are non-negligible. Having the transfer associated with an infrastructure project, training program, or human capital investment program may mitigate these concerns. On the other hand, they maybe less likely to merit attention across the short time horizon of a crisis.
There may also be developmental synergies and accumulation of social capital that emerge from the process of putting together projects with NGOs that would yield dividends in the future. (Isham et al.1995 , Zyl, et al 1995 , Bain and Hicks 1998 , Fox and Gershman, 1999 It may be that governments are far more willing to come up with funding for a project that actually creates an asset rather than one that simply transfers or pays for work on recurrent projects.
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As noted above, from an theoretical point of view this is probably indefensible: to maximize discounted social utility, it is desirable to minimize the diversion of resources to the future. But governments may want "something" to come from their spending or perhaps from a political point of view, it may be more advantageous to deliver 5 jobs and an infrastructure project rather than 10 jobs. Or donors may believe that investments may make it unlikely that there will be recourse to their resources for emergency purposes in the future.
Ravallion ( Further, recurrent concerns with low project quality both in workfare programs and SIFs (Khadiagala 1995 , Tendler 2000 guess, project quality, but it must adversely affect both. The good news is that, even if the project is of low quality, the high consumption rate of discount implies that this is largely irrelevant to the overall value of the emergency program-we can think of the investment costs as simply part of the cost of the transfer. On the other hand, these costs are so high as to warrant very careful evaluation of political economy arguments, and a search for alternative vehicles.
Another consideration that was of concern to Asian governments during the crisis is that transfer programs may generate constituencies during the crisis who then fight for their preservation after. Tying the transfer to a project which has a very visible ends may politically facilitate scaling back the program when it is less necessary (World Bank 2000). However, Tendler (2000) argues that the reverse dynamic has occurred in Latin America. The autonomous and rule-free units set up under SIF emergency programs often sought to perpetuate themselves arguing, counter to her findings, that they were better agents for delivering small scale rural project than traditional government bureaucracies.
Investment projects generate employment.
In the cases where workfare programs are advocated, several reasons are put forward for why this is an important goal.
12 Probecat in Mexico probably should be seen largely as a transfer program with limited impact on human capital accumulation. Wodon and Minowa (1999) There is also something odd about the fact that discussions of safety nets for better-off or formal workers revolve around personal accounts (forced savings so workers may smooth across time) or insurance schemes. Neither envisages work per se as a necessary concomitant of smoothing consump tion. In fact, we can think of transfers as the limiting case of the increasingly popular personal accounts where the worker's contribution goes to zero. Here again, we get into the moral hazard type questions implicit in (1) above. But it is also the case that, find, contrary to earlier evaluations, no impact on unemployment or wages.
by definition, emergency programs are dealing with a temporary absence of jobs and, again, the long run incentives may not be central. Ravallion (1991) again introduces a potentially important political economy issue related to the moral hazard issue above. Donors may think that their beneficiaries should work and require reassurance that the recipients will no be made so much better off that they would be discouraged from taking the necessary steps to escape poverty in the future.
ii. Job creation may be important symbolically. At a national level, an "employment" program may have symbolic value in attacking the most obvious indicator of crisis and may ease acceptance of macro-stabilization programs, which may have longer-term positive impacts on the poor. We could, in theory, also treat this as part of the unmeasured return to the investment. Several analysts, citing the very limited coverage and impact of the SIFs on employment and the poor, suggest that the more symbolic motivation is weighted heavily by sponsors of SIFs 13 and that these programs may deflect attention away from more effective interventions or adjustment programs with fewer negative impacts.
iii. Targeting: It may, in fact, be difficult to target pure transfers. Progresa type schemes are very intensive in information and their focus on permanent poverty may mean that they may miss those thrown into poverty by the crisis. 14 The selfselection that arises out of the sub-market wage policy of the employment schemes provides an alternative means of targeting that is superior on both counts. In this case, the overhead costs of a workfare scheme may thus be seen as part of the cost of targeting. However, it is important to stress that investment components per se are not necessary to get the targeting benefits of workfare and,
given the discount factor, really only increase the costs of targeting. Keynes'
13 See Stewart and van der Geest (1995) Cornia (1999) and Tendler (2000).
14 As Ravallion (1991) and others have stressed, the imperfect measures of living standards of potential recipients lead to costs that, in a world without these constraints, would be deadweight losses.
digging and filling of holes, or any other recurrent project-gardening, repainting, -will target and will cost less than an investment project per dollar transferred.
II. Problems in Evaluating Emergency Programs

The Problem of Multiple Objectives: Resisting the Temptation of Conventional Evaluation Measures
Equation 2b relative to "make work" type programs. Table 1 shows that how "costly" a program is per Note: Based on a daily wage of $5 worker depends greatly on how much capital or other materials is combined to construct infrastructure projects.
c. Comparison to pure infrastructure projects is unreasonable since the emphasis on employment generation means least-cost production methods may not be used.
Evaluated against a pure transfer, a pure job creation program, or human or physical capital investment projects, emergency programs with investment or job creation components will likely come up short. Whether this type of hybrid program is deemed a success depends fundamentally on the weights put on each objective in the social welfare function. 15 Since by nature these weights will be highly subjective, virtually any program can be justified.
An example: Trabajar in Argentina.
Ravallion's evaluation of the Trabajar workfare program in Argentina provides a concrete example of the difficulty of evaluating emergency programs.
1. His emphasis on high labor intensity projects to increase present transfers, to the detriment of total project value implies a consumption discount factor above the usual market rate. This implies that a Trabajar infrastructure project will appear inefficient when compared to those without the transfer goal.
2. His calculation of the total benefit (transfer + investment) to the poor/per $1 (~. 
The Importance of Financing Structure
If we knew exactly how to weight the elements of equations 2a and 2b and the programs were faced with a fixed budget, the socially optimal combination of transfers, investment and job creation could be calculated. In practice, however, emergency programs have been designed in such a way that budget is to a large degree endogenous to the design of the program. This further complicates the process of evaluation in significant ways.
How are costs shared between local and central governments? Is labor intensity relevant?
In both and Trabajar and in some of the many varieties of Social Investment Funds (SIF), higher labor intensity and hence lower cost per job created is considered better (Goodman et al. 1997 , Ravallion 1998 . However, in both types of programs, there is often system of implicit or explicit counterpart funding by the local municipalities/communities of resources contributed by the central government. In some SIFs (Peru for example), the central government provided the financing for materials and the municipality/community the financing for labor. As discussed earlier, since the labor is often volunteered, this structure has little value as an emergency program and in
Trabajar and now Manos a la Obra, the financing is reversed. In both funding schemes, the total resources available vary with the labor intensity of the project, and this has important implications for evaluation. Consider three possible financing designs:
1. If the total financing is fixed, perhaps by a constant rate of cofinancing between central and municipal governments/communities, we maximize equation 2a subject to a fixed financing constraint. Abstracting from the value of employment (the third argument) for now, the optimal labor intensity depends primarily on the relative value placed on present transfers to labor vs the value of the projects as discussed in the first part of the paper. The correct discount factor to use in project evaluation is the consumption discount factor above and this will lead, as a rule of thumb, to an emphasis on high labor intensity projects.
2. If the central government provides materials and municipalities/communities provide paid labor, as in some SIF, then higher labor intensity means simultaneously more resources devoted to the program and to the total value of the investment projects, and a larger share of total resources devoted to labor presently. High labor intensity is, without question, good. and hence the total value of investment projects and future benefit to the poor.
Since there is no impact on present transfers, the correct discount factor may well be the standard economy wide interest rate. Under this financing scheme, it
is not clear why we would prefer more labor intensive projects.
In sum, the criteria for evaluation, and in particular, the discount factor appropriate to the evaluation of investment components depends on the structure of financing.
The financing problem for conditional transfers can be framed similarly to the workfare program. The households (municipalities) provide the complementary factorsschool books, uniforms etc. However, because these costs offset the transfer and do not augment it as is the case with workfare programs, we should think of the central government as purchasing both "materials" and labor which would be the same as if we make no distinction between municipal and central resources (case 1 above). In the event that there is not excess capacity in schools, health clinics or training centers during the crisis, it is also necessary to include all additional supply side costs when comparing them to workfare programs.
Additionality
The traditional issues of additionality are important in evaluating emergency programs. Any central government subsidy to the municipal governments can lead to a "crowding out" of existing resources. If we suppose, for example, that the municipal governments had planned to implement a number of projects generating a certain amount of employment, it is difficult to be sure that an employment subsidy as envisaged in Trabajar or Manos a la Obra doesn't merely free up municipal resources for other purposes with no net gain in employment. In Colombia, for example, municipal investment programs are approved yearly at the central government level and, for the first year of the emergency program, additionality could be guaranteed. However, in subsequent years, municipal governments can redirect investment resources and offset the impact of the program.
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Theoretically, this is potentially a very serious issue and there is little existing evidence that would assure that it isn't important in practice. Nor does Bank experience with additionality issues suggest ready contracting mechanisms that would eliminate the problem. One impractical solution is careful monitoring of all municipal budgeting and investment decisions. A second is simply that that projects be kept effectively separate from municipal finances, perhaps through complete financing by the central government.
This, however, eliminates much of the leverage arising from municipal contributions.
Conclusion:
Most emergency programs-workfare programs, conditional transfers, or training programs-employed to date include an investment component, either an infrastructure project, or the protection or generation of human capital. This implies that their evaluation needs to incorporate their intertemporal dimension and, particularly, the very high rate of discount that families in crisis are likely to have.
Though on purely economic grounds, most of the investment components are likely to be unjustifiable when evaluated with the appropriate crisis discount factor, there may be unmeasurable returns to investment, social externalities, political economy effects, or in the case of workfare programs, an intrinsic value to employme nt itself that may make them justifiable. However, the difficulty of measuring the incidence and social importance of these considerations, and the trade-offs they often imply with emergency relief, makes disciplined evaluation of these projects elusive. Evaluation is further complicated by the fact that the way emergency programs are financed, and in particular, how the burden is shared between central and municipal governments. The goal of this article has therefore been to attempt to highlight and discuss the factors that policy makers might bear in mind while designing such programs in the hope of making the unavoidable subjective judgement calls somewhat better grounded.
